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Now It Is Impossible 'Simply To Continue Along Previous Lines': 
A Partial Design Sketch of Enactable Social Theorizing 
 
Peter J. Taylor  
Science in a Changing World graduate track  




A compilation of 39 notes provides the basis for two shifts: from shaping a better social 
theory to allowing for social theorizing; and from representing social dynamics to 
enacting the social theorizing so as to repeatedly define and pursue engagements in the 
heterogeneous dynamics that intersect in all kinds of society-making. A key move is to 
bring the multiple strandedness of changing social life into the center by combining, on 
one hand, the analysis of intersecting processes, which link across scales in the 
production of any outcome and in their own on-going transformation, and, on the other 
hand, a participatory group process, the historical scan, to generate a repeatable group-
specific praxis. The notes are mostly drawn from my previous contributions to 
environmental studies, social analysis of science (STS), and innovation in teaching and 
group processes. 
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Now It Is Impossible 'Simply To Continue Along Previous Lines': 
A Partial Design Sketch of Enactable Social Theorizing 
 
Peter J. Taylor  
Prepared for the May 2012 New England Workshop on Science and Social Change 
(brushed up subsequently without altering the substance of the original).                                                                                                                                      
 
Setting the Scene 
1. 
It is one thing to know that people are not passive recipients of life forces. But it is 
another thing to identify [people's multiplicity of] initiatives, and to contribute to a 
context that is favorable to their endurance. It is one thing to know that the totalizing 
and invariably pathologizing accounts of people’s lives are social constructions that 
sponsor highly negative conclusions about their identities. But it is another thing to 
identify initiatives that might provide a point of entry to the sort of rich story 
development that brings with it more positive identity conclusions and new options 
for action in the world. (White 2011, 29) 
 
2. 
 [S]elf-care is never a selfish act — it is simply good stewardship of the only gift I 
have... Anytime we can listen to true self and give it the care it requires, we do so 
not only for ourselves, but for the many others whose lives we touch. [As] the poet 
Rumi [stated] in his piercing observation: "If you are here unfaithfully with us, you're 
causing terrible damage." If we are unfaithful to true self, we will extract a price from 
others. We will make promises we cannot keep, build houses from flimsy stuff, 




My sense of critical thinking is [that] it depends on inquiry being informed by a strong 
sense of how things could be otherwise. I want students to see that they understand 
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things better when they have placed established facts, theories, and practices in 
tension with alternatives. Critical thinking at this level should not depend on students 
rejecting conventional accounts, but they do have to move through uncertainty. Their 
knowledge is, at least for a time, destabilized; what has been established cannot be 
taken for granted. Students can no longer expect that if they just wait long enough 
the teacher will provide complete and tidy conclusions; instead they have to take a 
great deal of responsibility for their own learning. Anxieties inevitably arise for 
students when they have to respond to new situations knowing that the teacher will 
not act as the final arbiter of their success. A high level of critical thinking is possible 
when students explore such anxieties and gain the confidence to face uncertainty 
and ambiguity. (Taylor 1995a). 
 
4. 
Why write about social theory? Three initial answers, corresponding to the three 
epigraphs: 
a) I am critical of the complementary depressive and fantasizing modes of most left-
leaning social theory and thus want to provide an alternative. In the depressive 
mode, the dynamics of capital (or fractions of capital, such as the finance sector) 
dictate what is possible, as if no-one could assume a role within the structured 
system that could alter the dynamics and as if the human actors were, either blind to 
the real dynamics or act unwittingly to provoke the powerful into trumping their 
actions. In the fantasizing mode, the talk centers on building or aligning with mass 
movements (or at least with emergent social movements) in order to resist and one 
day overturn these dynamics. In the meantime, discussions often flip to, for example, 
what Obama should do (or should have done), what U.S. policy should be etc., as if 
the speaker (or the listener) could be transported into a decision-making position 
and act true to their principles without having been changed by the process of 
assuming this role in the structured system. 
 
(Why "fantasizing"? In fantasy, people envisage worlds and mentally inhabit them, 
escaping the practical difficulties of action. Achieving some result in the material 
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world requires human agents to be engaged with materials, tools, and other people 
[Robinson 1984].) 
 
b) Being faithful to myself leads me to admit my proclivity for making what I now call 
design sketches (Taylor 2012). Design is about intentionality in construction, which 
involves a range of materials, a sequence of steps, and principles that inform the 
choice of material and the steps. Sketch denotes the incompleteness of the 
designs—there is often a gap between the principles I lay out and their realization in 
practice or established knowledge. The limitations of design sketching not 
withstanding, I want to give rein to my proclivities. 
 
c) These notes as a whole constitute a design sketch about enactable social 
theorizing, which is intended to provide an alternative to the depressive and 
fantasizing modes. At the same time, each note invites readers to consider 
alternatives, especially those that center around engagement in specific concrete 
situations. The notes introduce a number of tools, processes, and perspectives that 
readers might adopt or adapt in their engagements. Such carry-over and practice 
(Taylor 2011a) can be seen as an alternative to wishing and waiting for a confident 
and reliable account of social continuities and changes. 
 
5. 
A significant tension is present in speaking of tools that others "might adopt or adapt." 
When I inquired on a listserv for facilitators about what is known about conditions that 
influence uptake and application of skills learned in workshops, one response was: "I 
would say, unfortunately, that little transfer between workshops of a classroom nature 
and on-the-job behavior is likely to occur unless the ‘workshop’ is tied to the actual work 
itself and, indeed, embedded within the practice."  The 4-day New England Workshop 
on Science and Social Change (Taylor et al. 2011) sought ways around this stricture, as 
evident in the title including the phrase “ways to support translation” (NewSSC 2012). 
Yet, the description of that workshop topic begins by citing commentators on the spread 
of innovations [who] have noted the challenge of moving beyond the enthusiasm of 
 4 
early adopters—Innovations have to be translated so that they address the pragmatic 
and particular concerns of other potential adopters (Wikipedia n.d). In this vein, 
researchers on educational technology, such as Barry Fishman (pers. comm.), are 
interested less in “scaling up” after a successful piloting of a new learning technology 
than in “digging in deep.” That is, spend time in a school working with all-comers, not 
only those teachers eager to try out new technologies. Digging in deep requires 
attention to the school as an organization and to the demands placed on teachers. 
Those whom innovation theory labels the “early majority” need those who come bearing 
innovations to recognize other demands, such as boosting students’ standardized test 
scores, that shape teachers’ work. (The current label for educational research that 
combines innovations with examination of school organization is “design-based 
implementation research," Penuel et al. 2011.) It may well be asked: To what extent are 
NewSSC workshops a retreat from digging in deep? Are they a space to prepare us to 
go home and dig in deep? To what extent is my proclivity for making design sketches 
reconcilable with support for translation and digging in deep? 
 
6. 
In the late 1980s Roberto Mangabeira Unger laid out a “constructive social theory,” 
which centered on “institutional and imaginative frameworks of social life [that] supply 
the basis on which people define and reconcile interests, identify, and solve problems.” 
He went on to note: “These frameworks cannot be adequately explained as mere 
crystallized outcomes of interest-accommodating or problem-solving activities” (1987, 
4). Unger sought to present a view of how these “contexts [or frameworks] stick 
together, come apart, and get remade” (1987, p.5). I was attracted to his efforts, but I 
found his work too theoretical; it seemed too difficult to translate into practical 
implications. In my thinking about scientific activity at that time I was exploring a notion 
of representing-engaging, that is, modeling or representing of phenomena cannot 
proceed without multiple choices about practice and action in society, that is, engaging 
(*see #6a). In contrast, Unger seemed to be giving readers a representation of our 
“society-making powers" from a position outside of what he was representing. Writing in 
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that way is in line, it seems to me, with how social theory has been done. 
 
6a. 
As a broad-brush example of representing-engaging, Francis Galton collected 
copious data about similarities among relatives, but none about the nurture side of 
how people's traits develop. His choices of data collection were bound up, in my 
interpretation (Taylor 2008), with his concerns about whether exceptional individuals 
(of his own ilk) could rely on biological heredity to ensure that their offspring would 
be part of the next generation's exceptional individuals. 
 
7. 
I freely concede that the same tension between outsider representing and representing-
engaging are evident when address social theory in my book Unruly Complexity: 
Ecology, Interpretation, Engagement (U. Chicago, 2005). This happens only in the 
thematic endnotes, excerpted below (#33-34), that address social theory in relation to 
environmental change and the relation of agency and structure(dness). The tensions 
also run through my more recent thinking about combining an intersecting 
processes view (which has an outside representational emphasis) with an Historical 
Scan activity (produced by a particular group at a particular time) to generate enactable, 
group-specific praxis. These notes explicate and extend that thinking and these 
tensions. Let me orient the reader to what is to follow through five brief points: 
a) I am interested in social theory, but critical of what I call Social Theory. I think that 
intersecting processes provides an approach that improves on the well-known 
structure-agency duality (i.e., actions of social agents are enabled and constrained 
by social structures and social agents, in acting, imperfectly reproduce those 
structures). 
 
b) At the same time my preliminary notes on these issues (#9, 12, 13, 20-22) adopt 
the representational stance I note above in Unger’s work (#6). 
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c) I am also interested in people’s problem-solving and path-charting abilities in well-
facilitated collaborative processes (which Unger might criticize as putting too much 
stock on “crystallized outcomes of interest-accommodating or problem-solving 
activities”). At the same time, I have wanted to find ways to inject understandings of 
structures (or Unger’s structure-making) into these processes (#17, 26-29). 
 
d) I am critical of the complementary depressive and fantasizing modes of most left-
leaning social theory (#3a). Discussions of the dynamics of capital—or, similarly, of 
deep forces or structures that are the determinants of social change—address 
poorly the heterogeneity of things people do and say, the shifting associations and 
how, to borrow Unger’s words, they ”stick together, come apart, and get remade,” 
and the shifts in what any one person does and say from one micro-context to 
another. 
 
e) I am interested in social theory that addresses the preceding heterogeneity, 
shifting associations, and contingency—that brings the multiple strandedness of 
changing social life into the center (as against being the variation or noise around 
the deeper [more essential] Social Dynamics [capitalization deliberate here]). That is 
what motivates the combining of intersecting processes and Historical Scan 
mentioned above and detailed below (#23). This move aims to shift the focus from 
shaping a better social theory to allowing for social theorizing, as well as shifting the 
focus from representing social dynamics to enacting social theorizing in the form of 
repeatedly defining and pursuing engagements in the heterogeneous dynamics that 
intersect in all kinds of society-making. Enactable, contingent social theorizing 
maybe unsettled and unsettling, but should social theorizing be something all that 
much easier to grasp than society-making? 
 
In order to move systematically towards explicating the points above, let me introduce 
three ideas—unruly complexity (#8-11), heterogeneous construction (#12-13), and 




What if Everything is Already Unruly Complexity? 
8. 
A question: What if I think that everything is already unruly complexity (Taylor 2005)? 
What do I do? 
One step would be to define for whoever is reading what I mean by that term. Unruly 
complexity, as I use the term, refers to situations that 
• consist of heterogeneous components;  
• are built up over time and subject to ongoing restructuring; and 
• are embedded in wider dynamics. 
Equivalently, for situations of unruly complexity: 
• definite boundaries are lacking; 
• what goes on “outside” continually restructures what is “inside”; and 
• diverse processes come together to produce change. 
 
9. 
A related step would be to illustrate this abstract definition. Consider a case of soil 
erosion in a mountainous agricultural region in Oaxaca, Mexico, which I have based on 
the analysis of Mexican colleagues Raúl García-Barrios and his brother Luis (García-
Barrios and García-Barrios 1990). 
The severe soil erosion evident now in the municipality of San Andrés is not the first 
occurrence of such a problem in the region. After the Spanish conquest, when the 
indigenous population collapsed from disease, the communities abandoned their 
terraced lands, which then eroded. The remaining populations moved to the valleys 
and adopted laborsaving practices from the Spanish, such as cultivating wheat and 
using plows. As the population recovered during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, collective institutions evolved that reestablished terraces. Erosion was 
reduced, soil dynamics were stabilized, and perhaps some soil accumulation was 
stimulated. But this type of landscape transformation needed continuous and proper 
maintenance. If a terrace were allowed to erode the soil would wash down and 
damage lower terraces; there was the potential for severe slope instability. What 
made the necessary maintenance possible were collective institutions, which first 
 8 
revolved around the Church and then, after independence from Spain, around rich 
Indians called caciques. These institutions mobilized peasant labor for key 
activities—not only maintaining terraces, but also sowing corn in work teams and 
maintaining a diversity of maize varieties and cultivation techniques. The caciques 
benefited from what was produced, but were expected to look after the peasants in 
hard times, a so-called moral economy (Scott 1976). Given that the peasants felt 
security in proportion to the wealth and prestige of their cacique, and, given that 
prestige attached directly to each person’s role in the collective labor, the labor 
tended to be very efficient. In addition, peasants were kept indebted to caciques, 
and could not readily break their unequal relationship. The caciques insulated this 
relationship from change by resisting potential laborsaving technologies and ties to 
outside markets in maize. 
 
The Mexican revolution ruptured the closed system of reciprocal obligations and 
benefits by taking away the power of the caciques and opening the communities to 
the changing outside world. Many peasants migrated to industrial areas, sending 
cash back or bringing it with them when they returned to the community for periods 
of time. Rural population declined; transactions became monetarized; and prestige 
no longer derived from one’s place in the collective labor. With the monetarization 
and loss of labor, the collective institutions collapsed and terraces began to erode. 
National food-pricing policies favored urban consumers, which meant that corn was 
grown only for subsistence needs in this area. Little incentive remained for intensive 
agricultural production. New laborsaving activities, such as goat herding, which 
contributes in its own way to erosion, were taken up without new local institutions to 
regulate them. 
What follows is a diagram I drew to help me narrate this story to others and to highlight 
a number of themes, which I will articulate in due course (#20-21). 
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Historical processes leading to soil erosion in San Andrés, Oaxaca (from Taylor 1997c). 
The dashed lines indicate connections across the different strands of the schema. The 




A quite different response to the question in #8 would be not to mention the term unruly 
complexity at first, but to motivate certain themes connected to it through, for example, 
a fictional conversation of the form that follows (from Taylor 2000; see also 1997a): 
Reso (a researcher who analyzes natural resources issues): Consider this simple 
scenario... There are two countries. Each has the same amount and quality of arable 
land, the same population size, the same level of technical capacity, and the same 
population growth rate, say 3% per year. Country A, however, has a relatively equal 
land distribution, while country B has a typical 1970s Central American land 
distribution: 2% of the people own 60% of the land; 70% own just 2%. Both countries 
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double their populations very rapidly, but five generations (120 years) before anyone 
is malnourished in country A, all of the poorest 70% in country B would already be-
unless they act to change their situation. 
 
Ecolo (natural and human ecologist): But sooner or later in both countries everyone 
reaches the carrying capacity of their land. 
 
Reso: This is not just an issue of when the crisis occurs in the two countries. B’s 
poor would probably first experience what others call population pressure in the form 
of food shortages. They would link these shortages to inequity in land distribution... 
They might attempt to take over the underutilized land of the wealthy. The wealthy, 
anticipating this possibility, might fund paramilitary operations that target leaders of 
campaigns for land reform. Or build factories that employ the land-starved poor. The 
availability and nature of foreign aid would influence the actual choices in specific 
instances. The island's government might encourage emigration to more affluent 
countries and hope for remittances back to families that stay on the island. And so 
on. 
 
Activo (who asks what one can do on the basis of claims): Does this mean that we 
should support land reform and abandon population control programs? Or are you 
saying that we should back up these programs by boosting military aid to countries 
like B? 
 
Reso: I would have to ask to whom “we” refers. People are never all part of a 
uniform “we;” no real country is like country A. The important thing to understand is 
that the crises to which actual people have to respond come well before and in 
different forms from the crises predicted on the basis of aggregate population growth 
rates and ultimate biological and physical limits to growth. Indeed, in a country like B 
the poor would be justified in viewing anyone who focuses on population control 
policies as taking sides with those who benefit from the inequitable access to 
productive resources. 
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Ecolo: I have always stressed that affluent countries and people have 
disproportionate effect on the environment because of their higher per capita 
consumption of resources and the corresponding higher production of pollutants. 
 
Reso: But I’m not just saying that in any district, country, or ecosphere there are 
richer and poorer people. My point is that groups with different wealth and power 
exist, change, and become involved in crises because of their dynamic 
interrelations. 
 
Ecolo: OK, but even if the dynamics of population growth are more complex, it is still 
true that the greater the population, the greater the environmental effects. 
 
Reso: Not necessarily. The case of soil erosion in a mountainous agricultural region 
in Oaxaca, Mexico presents a different picture [see #9]... 
 
Reso is advancing the theme that the analysis of causes and the implications of the 
analysis change qualitatively if uniform units are replaced by unequal units subject to 
further differentiation as a result of their linked economic, social and political dynamics. 
The two islands scenario also illustrates an expository or conceptual theme, namely, 
when using simple themes or scenarios that are readily digested, design them to 
undermine simple, system-like formulations (such as "population growth leads to 
environmental degradation") by opening up issues—pointing to greater complexity and 
to further work needed to address particular cases (such as the case of soil erosion in a 
mountainous agricultural region in Oaxaca, Mexico). These opening-up themes call for 
or invite work based on dynamics that develop over time among particular, unequal 
agents whose actions implicate or span a range of social domains. This last sentence is 
quite a mouthful, but, once opening-up themes and scenarios are digested a little, they 




What if everything is already unruly complexity? The answer in #10 is that there is a 
qualitative difference in analysis of causes and in implications drawn from an analysis 
with uniform units versus one in which unequal units are subject to further differentiation 
as a result of their linked economic, social and political dynamics. This opening-up 
theme leaves unspecified, however, for whom are the implications? Suppose we 
consider the implications for the researchers. If we start with the simple well-bounded 
system of researchers in dialogue—using evidence and models—with phenomena in 
the world (A in the diagram below), a simple theme that opens things up is that 
researchers are also social beings. This means that there must be a second dialogue, 
this one with other social agents to establish some item of knowledge as significant—
with funders, audience, technicians, etc. (B in the diagram below). 
 
Recognition that research involves two simultaneous dialogues invites us to examine 
how this plays out in particular instances. Researchers must always already be aware of 
the simultaneous dialogues, so let us ask what would it mean for them to address this 
duality more self-consciously? (C in the diagram below). Recalling the definition of 
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unruly complexity, we might ask when their interactions with diverse social agents 
would stabilize and when would they be subject to ongoing restructuring? Answering 
this question would, we might expect, entail attention to the particularity of the 




If I think that everything is already unruly complexity, it follows that I think knowledge-
making situations are already unruly complexity (as #11 implies). In other words, there 
is an on-going process of building from diverse components, just as a house is built 
over time using plans and measurements, laborers and contracts, concrete and 
concrete mixers, wood and saws—then extensions and renovations get added. 
Heterogeneous construction is my term for building knowledge in the sense of scientists 
mobilizing a diversity of resources and, in so doing, engaging with a range of social 
agents. The following extract and figure from Taylor (2005, Chapter 4) provides a 
glimpse of this picture in a specific case: 
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[M]any interdependent resources helped Picardi to represent [nomadic] pastoralism 
[in sub-Saharan Africa] as an enduring, integrated, well-bounded system. The 
mechanist and behaviorist language of the strong SD [system dynamics] view of 
system privileged the outside, superintending agency. This complemented the 
interventionist position Western nations and international bodies assumed at that 
time when designing policy for the development of former African colonies. USAID 
dictated the study time to be short, which limited the research and engagement that 
might have revealed possible restructurings of pastoralist arrangements. Picardi did 
not see the need to model restructuring; this facilitated his use of SD to represent 
pastoralism in clearly characterizable long-term projections. These clear projections, 
in turn, fulfilled USAID's terms of reference, at least, with respect to the pastoralist 
sector of the region. And so on. No one resource or domain in this heterogeneous 
web stood alone—language, tools, work organization, and social relations beyond 
the work site reinforced each other, that is, rendered each other harder to modify. 
 
 
An impressionistic schema depicting diverse agents and selected resources involved in 
the construction of Picardi's system dynamics models. The size of the elements signifies 
their relative importance (Taylor 2005, 130). 
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13. 
Abstracted away from any particular case, the framework of heterogeneous 
constructionism holds that (Taylor 2005, 129-131): 
a) many heterogeneous components are linked together in webs, which implies that 
b) the outcome has multiple contributing causes, and thus 




d) causality and agency are distributed, not localized. 
 
Teasing out this framework leads me also to note that: 
e) construction is a process, that is, the components are linked over time, 
f) building on what has already been constructed, so that 
g) it is not the components, but the components in linkage that constitute the causes. 
 
Points b and e-g together ensure that 
h) it is difficult to partition relative importance or responsibility for an outcome among 
the different types of cause, e.g., mostly "scientific" but partly "social." 
 
Generally, 
i) there are alternative routes to the same end, and 
j) construction is "polypotent" (Sclove 1995), that is, things involved in one 
construction process are implicated in many others, and thus 
k) engagements within a construction process, even very focused ones, will have 
side effects. 
 
Finally, points e, j and k mean that 
l) construction never stops; completed outcomes are less end points than snapshots 
taken of ongoing processes. 
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This framework carries over, as will be seen in due course, into my ideas about 
intersecting processes and social theory (#34). For now, let us note that, within this 
framework, scientists in action should be thought of as imaginative agents, working 
knowledgeably and capably within intersecting domains of action, cross-linking 
heterogeneous resources over time in order to represent-engage, that is, to build, and 
to build on, heterogeneous webs. The outcomes of their scientific work—theories, 
readings from instruments, collaborations, and so on—are accepted because they are 
difficult to modify in practice. If we interpret science in terms of its heterogeneous 




The perspective of heterogeneous construction also means that interpreters of science, 
when they delimit the resources and agents that they consider relevant to some 
instance of science-in-the-making, also mobilize resources and engage with diverse 
social agents (Taylor 2005, Chapter 5, section A). Historians, sociologists, philosophers 
and other interpreters of science who recognize this might then reflect explicitly on the 
practical conditions that enable them to build and gain support for their interpretations. If 
interpreters are able to apply the same interpretive framework to their own research, the 
plausibility of their reconstructions of the work of scientists should be enhanced. There 
is, however, a more direct way that heterogeneous constructionist interpretation might 
influence science productively. Instead of relying on some second party—the interpreter 
of science—to do the reconstruction, we could have scientists interpret their own 
heterogeneous webs. Ditto for any researchers. They could reflect explicitly on how 
their own dialogue with other social agents affects their ability to study the situations 
that interest them. They could then attempt to identify for themselves multiple potential 
sites of engagement and change. 
 
To explore this possibility with a number of ecologists and natural resource researchers, 
I convened two mapping workshops in the late 1980s—the first in Helsinki, co-led with 
ecologist-philosopher Yrjö Haila; the second in Berkeley. These workshops were 
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designed to proceed as follows: Each researcher would focus on a key issue—a 
question, dispute, or action in which the researcher was strongly motivated to know 
more or act more effectively. All researchers would identify connections—things that 
motivated, facilitated, or constrained their inquiry and action. These might include 
theoretical themes, empirical regularities, methodological tactics, organisms, events, 
localities, agents, institutional facilities, disputes, debates, and so on. Researchers 
would then draw their maps—pictorial depictions employing conventions of size, spatial 
arrangement, and perhaps color that allow many connections to be viewed 
simultaneously. The map metaphor was meant to connote not a scaled-down 
representation of reality but a device that shows the way—a guide for further inquiry or 
action (Taylor and Haila 1989; Taylor 1990) (see #15 for one example). 
 
Over a series of sessions the workshop participants would present these maps and be 
questioned by other participants. As a result, they might clarify and filter the connections 
then reorganize their maps so as to indicate which connections were actually significant 
resources. The ideal was that researchers would self-consciously modify their social 
situations and their research together, perhaps in collaborations formed among the 
workshop participants themselves. Of course, given that mapping workshops were an 
experiment, it was not surprising that the ideal was not realized right away in those first 
two workshops (see #16). 
 
15. 
One map from the workshops illustrates the map making that resulted. The figure 
below, by a Finnish ecologist I will call “E,” was the most orderly of the maps, having 
been streamlined and redrawn on a computer. As such it does not do justice to the real-
time experience of its production during an actual workshop. Indeed, when viewed on 
their own all the maps appear schematic; valuable history, emphasis, and substance 





Redrawn outline of E’s map about how to conduct research on the ecology of carabid 
beetles in the city of Helsinki (from Taylor and Haila 1989 or Taylor 2005, 150) 
 
The central issue on E’s map is very broad, namely, to understand the ecology of 
carabid beetles living in the leaf litter under trees in urban environments. Shown on the 
map below this issue are many theoretical and methodological sub-problems, reflecting 
the conventional emphasis in science on refining one’s issue into specialized questions 
amenable to investigation. Placed above the central issue are various background 
considerations, larger and less specific issues, situations, and assumptions that either 
motivated work on the central issue or were related to securing support for the research. 
E’s research alone would not transform the urban public into recognizing that “nature is 
everywhere—including in the cities.” Yet, by combining the upward and downward 
connections, he reminded himself that work on the background issues, not only refining 
a working hypothesis, would be necessary to be able to keep doing his research. 
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In narrating his map, E mentioned some additional history. Many of the ecologists with 
whom he collaborated had been studying a forest area, but the group lost their funding 
when the Forestry Department asserted that forest ecology was their own domain. It did 
not matter that animals are barely mentioned in the ecology of forestry scientists. The 
ecologists self-consciously, but of necessity, turned their attention to the interconnected 
patches of forest that extend almost to the center of Helsinki, and explored novel 
sources of funding and publicity, including a TV documentary. The upward connections 
on the map were thus a recurrent, if not persistent, influence on E as he defined his 
specific research questions. 
 
16. 
To what extent, recalling the goals of mapping workshops, did the workshops lead 
participants to “clarify and filter the connections and to reorganize their maps”? It took 
considerable time to prepare maps, and the mapmakers did not devote further time to 
redraw their maps in response to interaction during the mapping sessions. To what 
extent then did researchers realize the ideal of “self-consciously modify[ing] their social 
situations and their research together, perhaps in collaborations formed among the 
workshop participants”? Several participants, at the Helsinki workshop in particular, 
claimed that the mapping workshop had expanded the range of influences, both 
theoretical and methodological, that they would bring into planning their future work. 
One workshop participant commented that mapping made it impossible “simply to 
continue along previous lines.” Nevertheless, although the workshops provided the 
opportunity to link up with others around revealed affinities, no new coalitions emerged; 
changes in the researchers’ work were not so dramatic.  
 
Taking into account the positive features as well as the limitations of these initial 
workshops led me on a path of expanding my toolbox, workshop-convening 
opportunities, and experience in facilitating processes that "encourage students and 
researchers to contrast the paths taken in science, society, education with other paths 
that might be taken, and to foster their acting upon the insights gained" (citing my faculty 
 20 
webpage, Taylor 2018; see also review of service and institutional development work 
Taylor 2015, Taylor et al. 2011; Taylor and Szteiter 2012). 
 
16a. 
In writing about limitations of the workshops and places for further development, this 
note, like several of the ones ahead, is clearly not relying on evidence of 
effectiveness to make some case. Instead, in describing the tool or process I am 
illustrating a step in the unfolding logic of the move to enactable social theorizing at 
the same time as modeling the spirit of exploration of potential resources—the 
adoption and adaptation into one’s own practices, imaginations, and interests—that 
matches my view of the agency of participants in such theorizing. 
 
17. 
In due course I will bring us back to processes that foster reflective practice (#23-26). 
But first I build on two other observations about the mapping workshops: 
a) the maps were centered on the individual mapmaker, tended to be idiosyncratic, 
and were not explicit about theory about the researchers' situatedness in society and 
its implications for their scientific practice. The two workshop leaders wondered what 
might happen if, say, they urged a standard format, offered models from analogous 
situations, or promoted various theories or propositions about micro- and macro-
social change? Would some idiosyncrasy still have to be encouraged to ensure that 
scientists reflect freely on and consider changes in their own particular research 
settings? 
 
b) the workshop participants were self-selected and by no means representative of 
researchers. 
 
If we combine these observations about mapping workshops with the heterogeneous 
constructionist perspective that knowledge-making entails mobilization of 
heterogeneous resources and engagement with diverse social agents, then we get to a 
programmatic answer to the earlier question about what to do if I think everything is 
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already unruly complexity. I—or anyone thinking that—faces the challenge… of using 
their "knowledge, themes, and other awareness of complex situations and situatedness 
to contribute to a culture of participatory restructuring of the distributed conditions of 
knowledge-making and social change." That challenge cannot be addressed on one’s 




Someone who thinks that everything is already unruly complexity and decides to 
address the challenge just enunciated might wonder if there are ways to discipline 
without suppressing the unruliness of complexity. And, given the subject of these notes, 
they might want to see how unruly complexity, heterogeneous construction, and 
mapping compare and contrast with published approaches to social theory. Here I find it 
helpful to introduce the idea of intersecting processes by reviewing an account from the 
1970s by the British sociologists Brown and Harris of the development of severe 
depression in a sample of working-class women. I also work in the extensions of their 
findings and a generalized narrative contributed by Bowlby, a psychologist who focused 
on the long-term effects of different patterns of attachment of infants and young children 
to their mothers (Bowlby 1988). 
 
Four factors are identified by Brown and Harris as statistically more common in women 
with severe depression at that time in the area studied: a severe, adverse event in the 
year prior to the onset of depression; the lack of a supportive partner; persistently 
difficult living conditions; and the loss of, or prolonged separation from, the mother when 
the woman was a child (under the age of eleven). Bowlby interprets this last factor in 
terms of his and others' observations of secure versus anxious attachment of young 
children to caregivers. In a situation of secure attachment, the caregiver, usually the 
mother, is, in the child's early years, "readily available, sensitive to her child's signals, 
and lovingly responsive when [the child] seeks protection and/or comfort and/or 
assistance" (Bowlby 1988, 167). The child more boldly explores the world, confident that 
support will be available from others when needed. Anxious attachment, in contrast, 
 22 
corresponds to inconsistency in, or lack of, supportive responses. The child is anxious 
in its explorations of the world, which can, in turn, evoke erratic responses from 
caregivers and subsequent attempts by the child to get by without the support of others. 
 
The top three strands of the figure below—class, family, psychology—combine the 
preceding observations to explain the onset of serious depression. The factors are not 
separate contributing causes, like spokes on a wheel, but take their place in the multi-
stranded life course of the individual. Each line should be interpreted as one 
contributing causal link in the construction of the behavior. In order to moderate the 
determinism that might come across in presenting a smoothed out or averaged schema, 
the lines are dashed; the links, while common, do not apply to all women at all times, 
and are contingent on background conditions not shown in the diagram. For example, in 
a society in which women are expected to be the primary caregivers for children (a 
background condition), the loss of a mother increases the chances of, or is linked to, the 
child's lacking consistent, reliable support for at least some period. Given the 
dominance of men over women and the social ideal of a heterosexual nuclear family, an 
adolescent girl in a disrupted family or custodial institution would be likely to see a 
marriage or partnership with a man as a positive alternative, even though early 
marriages tend to break up more easily. In a society of restricted class mobility, 
working-class origins tend to lead to working-class adulthood, in which living conditions 
are more difficult, especially if a woman has children to look after and provide for on her 
own. In many such ways these family, class, and psychological strands of the woman's 
life build on each other. Let us also note that, as an unavoidable side effect, the 
pathways to an individual's depression intersect with and influence other phenomena, 
such as the state's changing role in providing welfare and custodial institutions, and 
these other phenomena continue even after the end point, namely, depression, has 




Pathways to severe depression in a study of working class women. The dashed lines 
indicate that each strand tends to build on what has happened earlier in the different 
strands. See text for discussion and Taylor (1995). This figure is adapted from Bowlby 
(1988, 177). His schema is, in turn, adapted from Brown and Harris (1978, 265). The 
hypothetical genetics/biochemistry strand is my addition (#19). 
 
19. 
Suppose now, quite hypothetically, that certain genes, expressed in the body's 
chemistry, increase a child's susceptibility to anxiousness in attachment compared to 
other children, even those within the same family. Suppose also that this inborn 
biochemistry, or the subsequent biochemical changes corresponding to the anxiety, 
rendered the child more susceptible to the biochemical shifts that are associated with 
depression. (This hypothetical situation is given by the bottom strand of the figure 
above.) It is conceivable that early genetic or biochemical diagnosis followed by lifelong 
treatment with prophylactic antidepressants could reduce the chances of onset of 
severe depression. This might be true without any other action to ameliorate the effects 
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of loss of mother, working-class living conditions, and so on. There are, however, many 
other readily conceivable engagements to reduce the chances of onset of depression, 
for example, counseling adolescent girls with low self-esteem, quickly acting to ensure a 
reliable caregiver when a mother dies or is hospitalized, making custodial institutions or 
foster care arrangements more humane, increasing the availability of contraceptives for 
adolescents, increasing state support for single mothers, and so on. If the goal is 
reduction in depression for working-class women, the unchangeability of the 
hypothetical inherited genes says nothing about the most effective, economical, or 
otherwise socially desirable engagement—or combinations of engagements—to pursue. 
Notice also that many of these engagements have their downstream effect on 
depression via pathways that cross between the different strands. For example, if self-
esteem counseling were somewhat effective then fewer unwanted pregnancies and 
unsupportive partnerships might be initiated; both effects could, in turn, reduce the 
incidence of single parenthood and difficult living conditions. 
 
20. 
The Brown-Harris-Bowlby depiction of the multi-stranded life-course development of 
severe depression in a sample of working class women led me to begin using the 
term intersecting processes, of which heterogeneous construction is a particular 
instance. Indeed, all aspects of the framework of heterogeneous constructionism (#13) 
hold for intersecting processes. Readers might also notice that the García-Barrios-
García-Barrios-Taylor account of case of soil erosion in a mountainous agricultural 
region in Oaxaca (#9) analyzes social and environmental change as something 
produced by intersecting economic, social and ecological processes that operate at 
different scales (Taylor and García Barrios 1995; Taylor 2001, 2005). Understanding 
such cases requires attention to the ways these processes transgress boundaries and 
restructure “internal” dynamics, thus ensuring that the psychosocial situations (#18-19) 
or socio-environmental situations (#9) do not have clearly defined boundaries and are 
not simply governed by coherent, internally driven dynamics. Clearly the term 
intersecting processes addresses the same terrain as unruly complexity; the only 
reason to use the former term is to suggest that different strands can be teased out in a 
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somewhat disciplined fashion. In this spirit, let me review the soil erosion case (#9) to 
tease out the implications of an intersecting processes framework—and, by analogy, a 
heterogeneous constructionist framework: 
 
a) Intersecting processes involve inseparable dynamics. Processes of different kinds 
and scales, involving heterogeneous elements, are interlinked in the production of 
any outcome and in their own on-going transformation. Each is implicated in the 
others (even by exclusion, such as when caciques kept maize production during the 
nineteenth century insulated from external markets). Notice especially the 
relationship between environmental degradation and the population decline shown in 
the top strand of the figure in #9. This association can be used to grab the attention 
of environmentalists who identify population growth as a major environmental issue. 
However, it is neither population decline nor growth, but labor that was important in 
this case. Labor is something defined by the technologies of production (the second 
strand) and the social institutions that govern it. Such institutions operate both locally 
(the third strand) and at places distant from where the erosion occurs (the fourth 
strand). In short, the relationship between population and environmental change was 
highly mediated, depending on the technologies used and the local and national 
social and economic institutions through which labor and production were organized. 
No one kind of thing, no single strand on its own, is sufficient to explain the currently 
eroded hillsides. (This theme can be extended to call into question other 
explanations for environmental degradation that center on a single dynamic or 
process, e.g., climate change in erosive landscapes; increasing capitalist 
exploitation of natural resources; or modernization of production methods.) 
 
The theme of inseparable dynamics can be teased out into four aspects: 
b) In intersecting social-environmental processes, differentiation among unequal 
agents is implicated. Sustainable maize production depended on a moral economy 
of cacique and peasants, and the inequality among these agents resulted from a 
long process of social and economic differentiation. Similarly, the demise of this 
agro-ecology involved the unequal power of the State over local caciques, of urban 
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industrialists over rural interests, and of workers who remitted cash to their 
communities over those who continued agricultural labor. 
 
c) Heterogeneous elements and scales are involved. The situation has involved 
processes operating at different spatial and temporal scales, involving elements as 
diverse as the local climate and geo-morphology, social norms, work relations, and 
national political economic policy. 
 
d) Historical contingency is significant. The role of the Mexican revolution in the 
collapse of nineteenth-century agro-ecology reveals the contingency that is 
characteristic of history. The significance of such contingency rests not on the event 
of the revolution itself, but on the different processes, each having a history, with 
which the revolution intersected. 
 
e) Structuredness is not reducible to micro- or macro-determinations. Although there 
is no reduction to macro- or structural determination in the account of soil erosion, 
the focus is neither on local, individual-individual transactions nor on the complex 
patterns produced by multiple simple transactions. Regularities, e.g., the terraces 
and the moral economy, persist long enough for agents to recognize or abide by 
them. That is, structuredness is discernable in the intersecting processes. 
 
21. 
The synopsis of a case of soil erosion in Oaxaca in #9 has, in addition to motivating the 
themes of #20, a number of implications for thinking about the agency of the people 
studied and, reflexively, of researchers who reconstruct intersecting processes: 
 
f) The account represents agency as distributed across different kinds of agents and 
scale, not something centered in one class or place (Thompson 2002). In the 
nineteenth-century moral economy caciques exploited peasants, but in a relationship 
of reciprocal norms and obligations. Moreover, the local moral economy was not 
autonomous—the national political economy was implicated, by its exclusion, in the 
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actions of the caciques that maintained labor-intensive and self-sufficient production. 
Although the Mexican revolution initiated the breakdown in the moral economy, the 
ensuing process involved not just political and economic change from above, but 
also from below and between—semi-proletarian peasants brought their money back 
to the rural community and reshaped its transactions, institutions, and social 
psychology. 
 
g) The account has an intermediate complexity—neither highly reduced, nor 
overwhelmingly detailed. The elements included in my synopsis and in the diagram 
(#9) are heterogeneous, but I tease out different strands. The strands, however, are 
cross-linked; they are not torn apart. By acknowledging this intermediate level of 
complexity, the account steps away from debates centered on simple oppositions, 
e.g., ecology-geomorphology vs. economy-society, or ecological rationality vs. 
economic rationality. Similarly, by placing explanatory focus on the ongoing, 
intersecting processes, the account discounts the grand discontinuities and 
transitions that are often invoked, e.g., peasant to capitalist agriculture, or feudalism 
to industrialism to Fordism to flexible specialization. 
 
h) Intermediate complexity accounts favor the idea of multiple, smaller engagements 
linked together within the intersecting processes. My synopsis and diagram of the 
more detailed account by the García-Barrioses can be read as an engagement with 
current scholarly discourses in an effort to promote the concept of distributed 
agency. This concept has implications not only for how environmental degradation is 
conceptualized, but also for how one responds to it in practice. Intersecting 
processes accounts do not support government or social movement policies based 
on simple themes, such as economic modernization by market liberalization, 
sustainable development through promotion of traditional agricultural practices, or 
mass mobilization to overthrow capitalism. 
 
i) This shift in how policy is conceived suggests a corresponding shift in scholarly 
practice. On the level of research organization, intersecting processes accounts 
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highlight the need for trans-disciplinary work grounded in particular locations. They 
do not underwrite the customary multi-disciplinary projects directed by natural 
scientists, nor the economic analyses based on the kinds of statistical data available 
in published censuses. 
 
j) Finally, the intermediate complexity of the schema in #9 preserves a role for some 
kind of social scientific generalization. The synopsis and diagram abstract away an 
enormous amount of detail, a move that suggests that the particular case described 
by the García-Barrioses might be relevant to other cases. The account does not 
provide a general explanatory schema, but at least could serve as a template to 
guide further studies. In new research projects such a template would be elaborated 
and modified once researchers began to address the particularities of the situation 
they were studying. The particularities of each case would not, however, warrant 
starting from scratch when attempting to understand and engage in socio-
environmental change. The intermediate complexity of my account also means—and 
here I am applying some reflexivity to my own representational work—that I have, for 
the time being, deflected attention away from the need to examine the particular 
institutional and personal resources, agendas, and alliances that people like me 




I want more people to think in terms of intersecting processes. I want them to be able to 
read the diagrams I present, appreciate the theoretical implications of the concept, start 
to make their own accounts and diagrammatic depictions, and teach others to do the 
same. In this spirit, I developed an activity for a biology-in-society course (which I 
practiced at the first NewSSC workshop in 2004). The goals for students were: 
a) to understand the development of biomedical and social phenomena in terms of 
linkages among processes of different kinds and scales that build up over time—
genetics, treatment, family and immediate social context, social welfare systems and 
economics, wider cultural shifts, …. 
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b) to use graphic organizers to help them visualize such intersecting processes and 
to identify places where detail is missing and where further inquiry is needed. 
 
c) [depending on level of students and prior preparation] to contrast the implications 
of thinking in terms of direct causation (like spokes going to a hub) with 
heterogeneous construction [#12-13]. 
 
Students would read in advance Paul's (1997) account of the history of newborn 
phenylketonuria screening in the U.S. and my discussion of Brown, Harris, and Bowlby's 
work [as in #18-19], then follow instructions to produce an intersecting processes 
account of one of two phenomena: 
 
i) the life-course of a female with PKU detected by neo-natal screening: 
* Identify important connections mentioned in the Paul article (from p. 7ff) 
between things in the following categories or strands (open to adaptation): 
Condition of person with PKU; Diagnosis and care; Social support; and Wider 
social context. 
* Arrange the things, as well as you can given the information available, on 
parallel strands according to age of the person. 
 
ii) the routinization of neo-natal screening for PKU in the United States: 
* Identify important connections mentioned in the article between things in the 
following categories or strands (open to adaptation): Experience of persons with 
PKU (condition, care, social support); Advocacy (pro + con); State mandates & 
regulation; Research; and Wider social context. 
* Arrange the things, as well as you can given the information available, on 
parallel strands according to year (from 1930s to 1990s allowing more space for 
1960 through 1980). 
 
For both i) and ii): 
* Draw dotted lines to show connections between things. 
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* Identify connections about which you want to know more. Use the ideas under 
#13 as a checklist. 
Example of a connection for i): mandated test (social support) and neo-natal 
initiation of special diet (diagnosis & care). Example for ii): enthusiasm for 
biomedical prevention of mental retardation over education/social 
support/rehabilitation of retarded persons (wider social context) and promotion of 
PKU screening in advance of research on effects of diet (state mandates & 
regulation/ research). 
* Note where these instructions were hard to put into practice. 
 
I have not had an opportunity to run and then refine this activity since NewSSC 2004, 
but some issues that arose then included: 
• What do arrows mean? Mechanisms, material connections? Increase in probability? 
Makes possible? or Makes significant? 
• Some participants wanted to focus on explaining a specific outcome. 
• Technologies of representation to help, e.g., colors for countervailing processes. 




While intersecting processes accounts are produced by an outside observer, they have 
a complement in a participatory group processes called a Historical Scan (Taylor and 
Szteiter 2012, 96-98) which is used either to review a group's evolution over time or to 
set the scene in which a project is to be undertaken. The script that follows for such an 
activity uses three strands to organize relevant events. 
 
“As you consider your involvement in this workshop, let’s paint a picture of the 
context in which we will be operating. Let’s think about this context having a past 
and a possible future and operating on three levels: “local,” “regional,” and “global.” 
The “global” is the largest view relevant to the project, here, the world. The “local” is 
the personal perspective gained in the immediate unit of family, workplace, and 
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community. The regional is the specific arena in which the project operates, here, 
study and engagement in the area of science and its social context. 
Take a moment to jot down significant events at each of the levels over the past 10-
30 years or a future event that you hope will be in the 5 years ahead. 
Now choose 5* of them and write them in on the large Post-its in as large block 
letters as will fit. 
Select one from early on in this period. [Put them on the wall, consulting the group to 
keep them in order] 
 
… from the middle… from the later part of the period…. others [including those 
covering the whole period] 
When were you excited?… discouraged? 
 
What do these events remind you of? 
 
When were there transitions? 
 
If this were a book, what name would you give for the “chapters” between the 
transitions? 
 
…name for the whole “book”? 
 
What have you learned about a diverse group of people coming together to “read 
this book”? [Remind participants to be telegraphic — avoid speeches.] 
 
What have you learned about the context in which your planning and action/thinking 
and learning will take place? 
 





A Historical Scan at the end of a graduate course on Action Research, December 2010. 
24. 
 
As was the case with mapping (#14-17), Historical Scans tend to be idiosyncratic, 
unsystematic with respect to theory, and transient (i.e., differ markedly if the same 
participant[s] repeated the activity at another time). Yet, again also like mapping but in 
ways that are less individual-centric, Historical Scans are rich in—often generative of—
meaning for the participants and in guidance about what to do next. In light of this, I 
designed a collective construction of intersecting processes, an experiment that took 
place at the April 2010 meeting of the New England Workshop on Science and Social 
Change (NewSSC 2010). The steps are captured in this box: 
 
a) Participants had given 15-minute autobiographical introductions that explained 
how they came to be someone who wanted to participate in a workshop on “Where 
social theory meets critical engagement with the production of scientific knowledge.” 
b) Drawing on these introductions, participants undertook a Historical Scan to 
synthesize and contextualize autobiographical narratives so as to set the scene for 
the remainder of the workshop [as in #23]. 
c) Thinking of the three levels as strands of an intersecting processes account, 
participants identified gaps in their understanding of cross-scale linkages. 
 
This first experiment did not generate much active involvement of the participants in the 
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synthesis in step b); I’m not sure we even had time for the forming of questions about 
cross-sale linkages in step c). Modifications to address this shortcoming might include: 
• Allow for friendly amendments to correct and supplement the Post-its on the wall 
and their placement in time. 
• Make copies of the Post-its (or photograph and print the wall), then allow each 
participant to process the items on their own, starting from “When were you excited” 
and going through to naming for the whole “book.” 
• Follow this with freewriting (Taylor and Szteiter 2012, 89-90) to allow participants to 
translate the experience into what they have learned and what they will do on the 
basis of what they have learned. (See the last three questions of the Historical Scan 
in #23). 
• Share something clarified by the process with one partner and then in a whole-group 
discussion. 
 
The result of such an activity would always be idiosyncratic—or group-specific—and 
probably time-specific (a year or so later the same group might generate a different 
picture—just think of December 2008 in the USA versus November 2010!). The cross-
scale linkages would not be based on the depth of analysis that some historical political 
economists are capable of (e.g., Brenner 2009). However, as stated earlier, accounts of 
the larger political economy do not often clarify for an individual what to do, short of join 
in building a mass movement for revolutionary change. In contrast, this activity, 
especially if repeated in different groupings, projects, contexts, might be enactable. The 
idea is to provide meaning for the participants and guidance in what to do next at the 
same time as developing a deeper understanding of cross-scale linkages. Such group-
specific praxis is a central aspect of the idea of the enactable social theorizing 
foreshadowed in the working paper’s title and #3.  
 
25. 
Group-specific praxis—the idea of providing meaning for the participants and guidance 
in what to do next—has informed my Future Ideal retrospective experiments since 2010 
(but not yet, as will be addressed later, the understanding of cross-scale linkages). In 
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this activity participants collaboratively contribute to generating a practical vision for 
future developments based on evaluations or on statements, questions, and/or 
reservations concerning a certain challenge, such as learning from what has happened 
before (e.g., in a course or at a conference). 
 
Preparation 
a) Either assemble written evaluations from, say, a conference, or ask a defined 
group (e.g., students in a course) to compose five statements, questions, and/or 
reservations that are important to them concerning a defined challenge (e.g., 
supporting each other to complete the course project by the end of the 
semester). 
Session Proper (which may only include a subset of those who composed the 
evaluations or statements, questions, etc.) 
b) Circulate the sheets. Digest them one by one and make notes on what you 
read with a view to representing not only your own views but also those of others 
(who may or may not be present at the session). 
Future ideal retrospective 
c) Imagine yourself some time in the FUTURE looking back with a sense of 
accomplishment on how far the group (e.g., conference organizing group, the 
students in the course) have come in response to the challenge (e.g., the issues 
raised the evaluation) = the IDEAL. Construe accomplishment broadly so it can 
include your own reflection and growth. RETROSPECTIVE: What happened to 
make this so?—What different kinds of things do you envisage having 
contributed to the positive developments? These things can span the mundane 
and inspiring; tangible and intangible; process, as well as product; relationships 
as well as individual skills. Prepare 5 items (in large block letters on 8.5″ x 3″ 
sheets of paper). 
d) Silent Grouping of the items. (Feel free to move any single item or group of 
items, even breaking up someone else’s group, but take time to notice the 
clusters that emerge—don’t rush.) [While this is happening, an assistant types up 
the items so each participant can view their own copy of the items during step h.] 
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e) Naming of the clusters (together as a group). (Avoid nouns and categories. 
Instead, invent a phrase that captures how the cluster moves us towards the 
future ideal, e.g., not “humor” or “scramble,” but “Kept humor about the scramble 
needed to keep things going.”) 
f) Repeat steps d) and e). 
g) Review of a previous F.I.R. to provide guidance for the next step (Taylor 
2010). 
h) Individually group items and name clusters (including discussion in pairs of 
initial attempts). Group these groups and name them, until you arrive at a 
descriptive active name for the practical vision Post-its as a whole. [See figure 
below of my naming of clusters from a 2011 workshop.] 
i) Review the different clusterings and namings. 
 
Goals: 
• Collaboratively contribute to each participant generating a practical vision of 
future steps. 
• Use Post-it brainstorming (including clustering and naming) to rapidly assess a 
complex situation in a way that creates an experience of creativity. 
• Experience Post-it clustering as a fruitful way for participants to clarify their 
future and thus go on to complete the activity after the session is over. 
(It might even be possible to extend beyond this first Future Ideal phase to 




Names of clusters of Post-its formed by the author after a group brainstormed in 2011 
on what would have to have happened for an ideal outcome for researchers concerned 
with collaborative production of knowledge (in some area of) the life sciences and public 
engagement.". See Taylor (2011b) for more details of the process. 
 
Let me step aside from group-specific praxis to provide some background, which will set 
the scene for discussion in the next section of a key issue for social theorizing, namely, 
cross-scale linkages (#27-29). 
 
26. 
The Future Ideal Retrospective approach, but not by this name, is a tool used in 
Strategic Participatory Planning as developed by the Institute for Cultural Affairs (ICA) in 
Canada. ICA's techniques (which also include the Historical Scan) have been 
developed through several decades of 'facilitating a culture of participation' in 
community and institutional development in many countries. Their work anticipated and 
now exemplifies the post-Cold War emphasis on a vigorous civil society, that is, of 
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active institutions between the individual and the state and between the individual and 
the large corporation (Burbidge 1997). ICA planning workshops involve a neutral 
facilitator leading participants through four phases—practical vision, underlying 
obstacles, strategic directions, and action plans (Stanfield 2002). The ICA workshops 
aim to elicit participation in a way that brings insights to the surface and ensures the full 
range of participants are invested in collaborating to bring the resulting plans or actions 
to fruition. 
 
Such investment was evident, for example, after a community-wide planning process in 
the West Nipissing region of Ontario, 300 kilometers north of Toronto. In 1992, when the 
regional Economic Development Corporation (EDC) enlisted ICA to facilitate the 
process, industry closings had increased the traditionally high unemployment to crisis 
levels. The EDC wanted specific plans, but it also sought significant involvement of 
community residents. Twenty meetings with over 400 participants moved through the 
first three phases—vision, obstacles, and directions. The results were synthesized by a 
steering committee into common statements of the vision, challenges, and strategic 
directions. A day-long workshop attended by 150 community residents was then held to 
identify specific projects and action plans, and to engage various groups in carrying out 




The vision for the West Nipissing region in Ontario, Canada produced by a community-
wide planning process in 1992 (West Nipissing Economic Development Corporation 
1993). 
 
A follow-up evaluation five years later found that it was not possible simply to check off 
plans that had been realized because the initial projects had spawned many others. 
Indeed, the EDC had been able to shift from the role of initiating projects to that of 
supporting them. It made more sense, therefore, to assemble the accomplishments 
under the headings of the original vision and strategy documents. Over 150 specific 
developments were cited, which demonstrated a stronger and more diversified 
economic base, and a diminished dependence on provincial and national government 
social welfare programs. Equally importantly, the community now saw itself as 
responsible for these initiatives and developments, eclipsing the initial catalytic role of 
the EDC-ICA planning process. Still, the EDC appreciated the importance of that 
process and initiated a new round of facilitated community planning in 1999 (West 
Nipissing Economic Development Corporation 1993, 1999). 
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When I learned about the West Nipissing case, I could not help contrasting it with my 
early experience in applied social research (see Taylor 2005, 94ff). In that research we 
undertook detailed scientific analysis of an agricultural region at some distance from 
those directly affected by the problems of salinization and economic decline. Projections 
of the economic and ecological future were straightforward as long as they preserved 
the basic structure of the situation. When innovative possibilities, such as reforesting 
abandoned land, were considered, the analysis became difficult. The audience for the 
final analyses was small and attention to the report short-lived. The government ministry 
that sponsored the research was unable to implement the policy change it desired and 
nothing more then became of the two or three person-years of research. 
 
The West Nipissing plan, in contrast, built from straightforward knowledge that the 
varied community members had been able to express through the facilitated 
participatory process. The process had been repeated, which presumably allowed them 
to factor in changes and contingencies, which might have included the impact of the 
North American Free Trade Association and the decline in the exchange rate with the 
USA. And, most importantly, the process has led community members to become 
invested in carrying out their plans and to participate beyond the ICA-facilitated planning 
process in shaping their own future. 
 
Some difficult questions for me were opened up by this contrast, given that my own 
environmental research has drawn primarily on my skills in quantitative methods. What 
role is there for researchers to insert the translocal into participatory planning—to 
contribute analysis of changes that arise beyond the local region or at a larger scale? 
For example, suppose I had moved to the agricultural region we studied and 
participated directly in shaping its future. I would still have had translocal knowledge 
about the government ministry's policy-making efforts, the data and models used in the 
economic analysis, and so on. Indeed, the local for professional knowledge-makers 
cannot be as place-based or fixed as it would be for most community members. How, 
then, can researchers take seriously the creativity and capacity-building that seems to 
follow from well-facilitated participation, but not to conclude that they have to go local 
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and focus all their efforts on one place? 
 
My reflection on these questions around 2000 led me to coin a term, flexible 
engagement. The term seemed to capture a process challenge, rather than content 
challenge for researchers in any knowledge-making situation: How can we connect 
quickly with others who are almost ready to foster—formally or otherwise—participatory 
processes and, through the experience such processes provide their participants, 
contribute to enhancing the capacity of others to do likewise. The term plays off the 
flexible specialization that arose during the 1980s, wherein transnational corporations 
directed production and investment quickly to the most profitable areas and set aside 
previous commitments to full-time employees and their localities. Would flexible 
engagement constitute resistance to flexible specialization, or an accommodation with 
it? This remained an open question for me as I gradually developed tools for engaging 
flexibly (Taylor et al. 2011, Taylor and Szteiter 2012). 
 
Translocal and Transversal 
27. 
My thinking about tensions between the local and the trans-local has been informed by 
the writing of the cultural analyst Raymond Williams. In the years just before his death in 
1988, Williams wrote two books that built directly upon his experience of moving from a 
childhood in the English-Welsh borderlands into a cosmopolitan world of intellectual 
exchange: the novel Loyalties (Williams 1985) and an unfinished set of episodes of 
environmental-historical fiction, People of the Black Mountains (Williams 1990, 1992). I 
was led to both these works through an essay by the geographer, David Harvey, 
“Militant Particularism and Global Ambition” (Harvey 1995). Williams's People of the 
Black Mountains resonates strongly with the project of analyzing change in terms of 
differentiated agents situated in intersecting processes—in this case, socio-
environmental change—but it was the novel Loyalties that kept me thinking about how 
to relate social structure and human agency. Through its central characters, in particular 
the Welsh Gwyn and his English birthfather Norman, Loyalties explores the tension 
between solidarities forged through working and living together in particular places—
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militant particularism—and the application of trans-local perspectives or abstractions. 
Moreover, it adds a temporal, trans-generational dimension that is especially significant 
given my interest in “self-conscious knowledge-making and social changing” or, in 
Williams's words, in “looking, in [an] active way, at the whole complex of social and 
natural relationships which is at once our product and our activity” (Williams 1980, 83). 
 
When the middle-aged Gwyn and elderly Norman finally meet, Norman pushes Gwyn to 
acknowledge that his scientific career has taken him away from his birthplace and 
enabled him to see more about ways the world is changing than people who remained 
in the Welsh towns. Political involvement, Norman argues, cannot be a simple matter of 
Gwyn staying loyal to his roots. Given the “powerful forces” that shape social and 
environmental change, we can “in intelligence” grapple with them “by such means as we 
can find” and take a deliberate path of action, but “none of us, at any time, can know 
enough, can understand enough, to avoid getting much of it wrong” (Williams 1985, 
357-8). Or, in the words of Norman's close intellectual and political colleague, Monkey 
Pitter, if we “go on saying the things we learned to say and it will be just strange talk, in 
a strange land” (161). People may try to align their work and lives within the prevailing 
social arrangements, but they should expect to become misaligned as the 
arrangements change around them. 
 
28. 
Questions about the significance of flexible engagement (#26) became more difficult 
when I learned that, in late 2002, a major employer in the West Nipissing region, 
Weyerhaeuser, closed its containerboard plant. A local newspaper article (Haddow 
2003) quoted a Weyerhaeuser spokesperson: "[T]he decision to close the facility is not 
a reflection on the employees of Sturgeon Falls and their abilities and efforts… It was 
made for economic reasons beyond their control." The spokesperson went on to explain 
that "the company's preference would have been to keep all facilities running, but the 
market changes and current economic conditions forced their hand... If we as a 
company do not adapt, then we will not survive and none of our employees will have 
jobs." The community sprang into action and threatened lawsuits, but the plant closure 
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was not reversed. 
 
Discussion of this case with colleagues involved in regional economic development led 
me to adjust the militant particularism—trans-local contrast. The translocal side is not 
only about perspectives or knowledge, but can also encompass resources that could be 
brought to a locality or withdrawn and withheld from it. There is room to think about and 
to explain which aspect of the translocal comes into play—knowledge or resources; 
contributed or withheld—and how they interact with solidarities forged through working 
and living together in particular places. 
 
29. 
Cross-scale linkages feature strongly in these last two notes, even if in an earlier note 
(#25) I remarked that the understanding of cross-scale linkages was not central to my 
Future Ideal Retrospective experiments. Weyerhaeuser's action clearly links West 
Nipissing into transnational or global economic changes. Discussions of globalization 
tend to highlight the increasing extent of economic and cultural connections or, 
complementarily, their increasing speed. In social studies of science and technology, 
the icons of extent and speed are the internet and the ever-accelerating project of 
genome sequencing. Such discussion reminds me of William Cronon's (1991) widely 
read account of the nineteenth century emergence of a “Metropolis of Nature,” namely, 
the city of Chicago. The picture he presents is of ever-increasing speed and expanding 
extent. What he does not highlight, however, is that the motor of the changing 
capitalism he describes is not simply speed and increasing extent, but differential speed 
and extent. The futures market, for example, takes off not simply because telegraphic 
communication connects the world more rapidly, but because some people in Chicago 
have access to that information well before and in greater detail than, say, farmers in 
the hinterland. It could be said that exploitation of differentials, or uneven development 
(Bond 1999), is a driver of political economies. In this vein, capitalism depends on 
moving on and leaving others behind, displacing costs in space and time, and avoiding 
accountability. In this sense, flexible specialization is not a novel development, but 
another instance of the fundamental dynamic of capitalist political economics. 
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Shifting attention from speed and extent to differentials in speed and extent points to a 
more general theme of looking for second-order effects hidden behind or implied by any 
direct relation or process. For example, as the anthropologist Eric Wolf shows in Europe 
and the People Without History (1982), the history of Western Europe since 1400 is 
totally bound up with the history of regions and peoples who are given no agency in this 
history. The idea that there are always groups hidden, but dynamically present, in 
dominant historical narratives is spelled out by historian Geoff Eley (2007) when, in 
discussing what is distinctive about our current era of globalization, he questions the 
standard histories of capitalist progress and of the formation of an organized working 
class: 
under any particular capitalism wage labour has in any case always continued to 
coexist with various types of unfree and coercive labour. The salience of such 
simultaneities—of the temporal coexistence inside a particular capitalist social 
formation of forced, indentured, enslaved, and unfree forms of work with the free 
wage relationship strictly understood—needs to be carefully acknowledged. Such 
simultaneities become all the more salient once we begin conceptualizing capital 
accumulation on a properly global scale by integrating the forms of surplus 
extraction occurring in the colonial, neocolonial, or underdeveloped worlds. The 
West’s privileged prosperity, including precisely the possibility of the social-
democratic improvements associated with the three decades after 1945, has been 
founded, constitutively, on horrendous repertoires of extraction and exploitation on 
such a world scale. 
 
The meaning of the social-democratic layer—indeed of any layer—of a globalized 
political economy emerges in relatedness. Synonymously: it emerges in cross-scale 
linkages or intersecting processes. The challenge, which is taken up when we return to 
group-specific praxis in #35 is to combine that with attention to the spatial, temporal, 





In #14, I extended from science to interpretation of science the idea that knowledge 
making involves heterogeneous construction—building knowledge in the sense 
researchers mobilizing a diversity of resources and, in so doing, engaging with a range 
of social agents (#12). Interpretation of science—by historians, sociologists, 
anthropologists, political scientists, philosophers and others—constitutes the field or 
arena now called science and technology studies (STS). Before returning to say more 
about group-specific praxis and enactable social theorizing (#35), I want to include a 
few notes—both appreciative and critical—on the STS approaches and social 
theorizing. 
 
The STS scholar whose work most resonates with these notes is Atsushi Akera. Let me 
reprise a 2007 review of his work. The strength of his 2007 book Calculating a Natural 
World (CANW)—and of the articles that precede it—lies in the dialogue between the 
shaping of historical narrative and the representation of the complexity of interactions 
that link institutions, occupations/professions, organizations, knowledge, artifacts, and 
actors. This dialogue presses at the limits on (or limitations of) both narrative and 
theoretical representation, especially with respect to: avoiding the determination of any 
layer of (or slice through) the complexity; capturing the interpretative openness (as 
against hermeneutic closure) for actors; and conveying the contingency and 
indeterminate quality of changes and of failed initiatives. 
 
Consistent with this framing, Akera proposes that “the immense productivity of research 
during the Cold War era resulted from the productive tensions between institutions” 
(CANW, 4). In contrast to the “relatively smooth process” by which the co-production of 
technology and social context has often been portrayed, Akera is interested in the 
“often-friction-ridden interplay of institutions, ideas, artifacts, and practices” (p.7). His 
cases studies of Cold War research show that “[t]ensions and differences often 
produced redundant, over-ambitious, and incoherent research programs” (p. 10). 
History of technology, he contends, needs to value the study of failure and to “make the 
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notion of failure relative if one’s goal is to document the less linear paths of innovation” 
(p. 338). In the spirit of symbolic interactionist sociology, Akera draws “attention to the 
contingent and indeterminate nature of institutional change” (p. 339), thus 
counterbalancing the functionalist emphasis he sees in some broader-brush historical 
sociology of technology. Formation of new professions and forms of organizing 
technology “often occurred at the intersection of multiple institutions and disciplines,” 
and involved “recombining prior knowledge and preexisting institutional forms,” and 
various actors “letting go” of some commitments in order to forge new associations (p. 
343). 
 
Such theoretical themes are evident from the earliest of Akera’s essays. For example, 
“Engineers or Managers” (2000) describes post- World War II engineers venturing into 
marketing, operations research, and project management, re-engineering computers to 
“meet the needs of administrators as opposed to scientists” (p.191-2). The National 
Bureau of Standards was involved in a variety of initiatives along these lines, but was 
never able to take a commanding position. The detailed historical narrative in this essay 
allows Akera to build up to theoretically informed discussion in which he notes how, on 
one hand, the flexibility of this history resonates with a symbolic interactionist (or social 
worlds) emphasis on “specific sites of interaction where social reproduction and 
transformation occur” (p. 212), while, on the other hand, the persistence of some ideas 
and distinctions in the narrative provides an opportunity to reintegrate the social 
structure that is un(der)theorized in symbolic interactionism. 
 
The Social Studies of Science article (2007) on ecologies of knowledge builds 
wonderfully on the historical-theoretical work of the book and earlier essays. It gives a 
stronger analytic purchase to the idea of ecology of knowledge (EoK) and lays the basis 
for a practical methodology. Often EoK has been used to refer in general terms to the 
heterogeneous complexity of factors, resources, and relationships implicated in the 
production of knowledge. This paper gets more specific. It explores a layered 
representation for an EoK in which layers correspond to different representational 
scales, e.g., actors,… occupations,… institutions,… historical events. This approach 
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focuses on the whole-part relationship (metonymy) and facilitates the study of the 
dynamic relationships among the layers as they develop over time. The more 
encompassing entities can be seen as metonymically instantiated through local 
practices, a move that avoids imputation of causality “to entities that reside on one side 
or the other of the sociotechnical divide” (p. 417). This is not an abstract schematization 
but is well illustrated through diagrammatic and textual reconstructions of historical case 
studies, such as Vannevar Bush’s research program centered around the differential 
analyzer and the emergence of systems programming as an occupation after World 
War II. 
 
Akera (2007) advances four main uses of this multi-layered representation of EoK:  
• visualizations (or diagrammatic depictions) of EoK can help in elaborating on the 
relationships described in historical and sociological narratives and in pointing to 
relationships that were not evident or explicitly stated;  
• questions posed within any one layer can be illuminated, e.g., concerning the 
development of technical professions;  
• more precise understandings of concepts in STS can be produced, e.g., 
“technoscience”; and  
• through mapping the different methodologies employed in the various areas of 
STS—especially as they relate to the broader scope of social analyses—more 
reflexive understanding of the use of these methodologies can emerge. 
 
Akera claims that this representation of EoK is a phenomenological not epistemological 
project (2007, 415), but I believe he is overly cautious or modest here. After all, he is 
asking us not simply to note the existence of heterogeneous, scale-spanning 
complexity, with its associated contingency and indeterminacy, but to struggle with its 
analysis and visualization. Philosophy of science and theory in STS does not yet have a 
strong handle on all this. As Akera notes, each of his suggested uses of the EoK 
representation brings “historical evidence into sociology [not] by pitting the particularism 
of history against the generalizations of social theory, but by encouraging the use of the 
empirical wealth of history, as mediated by the representation, to support a more 
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grounded approach to social theory” (p. 435). This essay is careful, thoughtful, and 
thought-provoking and I look forward to future re-readings—as well as to re-viewings of 
the innovative flash animations of his case studies from his publications (Akera 2004). 
Other readers who have followed the STS scholarship on heterogeneous complexity, 




In STS it has become popular to invoke non-human agency, a move initiated by Latour 
and Callon when they used the semiotic label actants for human, other living beings, 
and non-living things alike in their descriptions of how scientists secure support for their 
theories (Callon 1985; Latour 1988; 1999). The playfulness of the resulting 
anthropomorphic accounts seems to animate the discussion of the non-human 
resources, but in practice Latour’s and Callon’s accounts reduce agency to a lowest 
common denominator, namely, resistance to the agency of others. Human purposes, 
motivations, imagination, and action do not enter the analysis, except that humans have 
to attempt to overcome resistance. Taylor (1993) interprets this move as follows: If 
scientific agents are viewed as acting with a minimal psychology—almost without 
mental representations—then this ensures that inborn dispositions, cognitive 
constraints, individual creativity, and so on, cannot determine action and belief. This 
absence preempts the analyses of others who invoke the internal cognizing mind to 
resist the social construction of science. It also leaves no place for interests or other 
external influence to reside inside the scientist’s head, and thus counters earlier 
analyses in social studies of science that allowed social context or social forces to 
determine scientists’ beliefs or actions. In short, invoking non-human agency can be 
interpreted as promoting a particular view about social causality and the character of 
human agency in the production and reproduction of social structuredness. (See 
Downey and Dumit 1997 for alternative perspectives on non-human agency, which 
begin from observing anthropologically the routine practices in which people—not only 




In STS, as in sociology and political theory more generally, there are two common 
moves that I resist. The first is to a) describe some changes, e.g., a multifaceted strands 
of the growth of manufacturing industry in a country, b) give it a label, especially an “-
ization” label, e.g., industrialization, and then c) talk about the Process or Social 
Dynamics of industrialization as if that had a causal motor of its own (see #7e) rather 
than being a descriptive summary term for a set of intersecting and heterogeneous 
processes. A milder form of this move is to get scholarly mileage by naming something, 
e.g., a boundary object, when what is needed for an explanation in any specific situation 
is teasing out of the intersecting processes that temporarily stabilize and give 
significance to that object. 
 
The second move I resist is to point to breaks or crises, e.g., the Epochal Break (Taylor 
2012b), the shift from mode-1 to mode-2 knowledge production (Gibbons et al. 1994) or 
Traweek's (1994) phase transition: 
 
Knowledges, technologies and societies have been based on simplicity, stabilities, 
uniformities, taxonomies, regularities and hierarchies. Now we are facing complexity, 
instabilities, variations, transformations, irregularities and diversity. Sometimes, 
however, she presents the second set of attributes as the way the world has always 
been; what has changed is the favored aesthetic of representation. I think we can 
attribute this equivocation to the greater rhetorical power of the claim that a marked 
(evolutionary) transition is occurring (to complexity, post-modernism, etc.). To grab 
our attention, to stimulate us to respond, it seems enough for Traweek to point to the 
new era of complexity (or to point to transgressions as evidence of its coming into 
existence). In contrast, if we followed her shift in aesthetics interpretation, we would 
need to analyze the ongoing reconfiguration of knowledges, technologies, societies, 
and aesthetics in order to identify where and how to intervene. The mere existence 




Traditional, big “S” Social theory seeks to account for the structure and dynamics of 
Society as a whole (Münch 1987; see also edited collections Bottomore and Nisbet 
1978; Giddens and Turner 1987). Although such theory is a possible source of 
propositions to inform researchers’ accounts of their situatedness in society, modern 
Social theory itself provides grounds for critique of its own project. 
 
Illuminating this point Goldblatt (1996) examines the contributions that Social theorists 
Giddens, Gorz, Habermas, and Beck make to shaping plausible, politically appealing 
and practical institutional alternatives and innovations in the context of environmental 
degradation and the rise of environmental concerns in Western politics. Among many 
respectful criticisms Goldblatt makes of the theorists’ work, he observes that the 
globalization of capitalism and (following Giddens and Beck) reflexive modernization 
mean that: “[t]oo many decisions about economic rationality have to be made by 
reflexive agents on the ground, on the basis of tacit practical knowledge, to make the 
transfer of decision-making powers to the centre effective. No state, however flexible, 
can gather enough information, process it quickly enough or embody the essentially 
local knowledge and skills required in a rapidly changing economy” (Goldblatt 1996, 
193). 
 
It follows, I believe, that no theory about the dynamics of Society as a whole could 
provide sufficient resources for reflexive researchers. Researchers may find it helpful to 
consider multiple, partial social theories, but the challenge remains of weaving those 
theories together so that researchers do not allow simple propositions about 
overarching or underlying processes to govern their accounts of social situatedness 
(Taylor 1997b, 211ff). 
 
(For other accounts of social theorizing in the context of environmental change see 




There has been a long history in social theory of discussion of how to relate social 
structure and human agency (Dawe 1976; Giddens 1981; Sewell 1992; Vogt 1960; see 
Taylor 1996 for bibliography in context of interpretation of science). Concepts 
introduced in Unruly Complexity (Taylor 2005) provide the basis of a framework for 
moving beyond the structure-agency dualism. Playing off Sewell's dual dual, what 
follows I call the "triple-triple." 
 
In brief: Envisage agents operating within intersecting processes (IPs) that are 
interlinked in the production of any outcome and in their own on-going transformation 
(see #13, 20-21). Let these IPs be teased out into three sets of three IPs: the Personal, 
which connect the IPs of cogitation, body, and unconscious; the Local, which connect 
discursive themes, materials at hand, and local rules; and the Social, which connect 
Discourse, Materiality, and Rules. Agents heterogeneously construct a variety of 
projects at any time. In doing so, they imaginatively mobilize discursive themes, 
materials at hand, and local rules. Their cogitation involves some thematic framework 
that simplifies their actual and possible heterogeneous construction as it is constrained 
and facilitated by their unconscious and body. The Local IPs evolve as an outcome of 
what different agents are able to do in response to each other is doing. The Social IPs 
evolve as the linkage of many Local IPs, and are, in turn, drawn on or invoked through 
discursive themes by interacting agents in Local IPs. (See reflection on vibrating agency 
in Taylor 2005, 198-9.) 
 
Such a framework makes conceptual room for a view of distributed agency in relation to 
social structuredness. There is no reduction to macro- or structural determination. Nor is 
the focus on transactions among concentrated individual agents. Even if agents tried to 
stay focused on following some principle of morality or rationality, or sought to optimize 
some metric, such as their profit, they could not avoid contributing to many projects, 
given the intersections among Personal, Local and Social IPs. The view of human 
nature implied by the framework is similar to that of Dervin (1999) in which agents try to 
bridge “gaps” opened up by the inherent incompleteness or unboundedness of reality 
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and by their movement in time-space. Contingency is unavoidable, even necessary, in 
psychological development and construction (Hendriks-Jansen 1996; Urwin 1984). 
 
The framework also resists the subordination of the material to the mental or discursive 
that is effected, for example, by sociologist of knowledge Barnes, when he equates 
social order to “shared knowledge and aligned understandings” that confer “a 
generalized capacity for action upon those individuals who carry and constitute it” 
(Barnes 1988, 32, 57), or by social epistemologist Fuller, when he analyzes the rhetoric 
of promoting “public understanding of science” and calls for experimentation in widening 
public participation in debates over scientific claims (e.g., Fuller 2000). (Markus 1986 
provides a general analysis of the difficulties that philosophers and social theorists have 
reconciling the paradigms of “language and production”.) Of course, my framework 
specifies nothing about the particulars of any situation or how different agents should 
engage within those particularities, leaving most of the work still to be done. 
 
A Proposal and Open Questions 
35. 
In an earlier aside (#16a) I justified writing about workshops that had limitations and 
needed further development in terms of how the workshops illustrated the unfolding 
logic of the move to enactable social theorizing at the same time as I modeled the spirit 
of exploration of potential resources. In the notes to follow, the same justification 
extends to my proposing processes that have not yet been piloted and my leaving 
readers with open questions. The agency envisaged for participants in enactable social 
theorizing is not one of waiting for some authority to convince them through evidence 
before acting. 
 
As mentioned in #25, group-specific praxis involves providing meaning for the 
participants and guidance in what to do next. In order to bring in connections across 
scales, an Historical Scan (#23-24) could be combined with the Future Ideal 
Retrospective for groups. The script for such an activity could be readily generated from 
those for the two activities separately (#23-25), with an emphasis on paths ahead to the 
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ideal as well as the paths from the past that influence—positively or negatively—the 
participants' formulation of those paths ahead. 
 
Suppose, however, that we take this fusion one step further and invite participants to 
use different color Post-its to signify the three strands of each of the three IPs (#34), 
say, red for cogitation, discursive themes, and Discourse; blue for body, materials at 
hand, and Materiality; green for unconscious, local rules, and Rules. Post-its for the 
Personal IPs would be labelled with the person's initials so others can recognize who is 
behind them. The overall Future Ideal Retrospective/Historical Scan (FIR/HS) would be 
consist of three-stranded (i.e., three-colored) IPs for each of three layers—Personal, 
Local, Social (in place of “local,” “regional,” and “global"). 
 
What I suspect is that viewing the overall 9-standed picture would expose gaps in what 
the participants contribute. It may be, say, that the unconscious items that influence a 
person's past and future paths are not known or are too sensitive to express in public. It 
may also be that many items on Post-its apply to an extended period and so are difficult 
to place along a historical guideline. (Perhaps colored wool could be extended to the left 
and right of any such Post-it.) And so on. The short of it is that the approach needs to 
be experimented with and revised in light of actual experience. However, it never has to 
be perfect because the idea of group-specific praxis is that the group would revisit its 
FIR/HS at recurrent intervals. Similarly, because the idea is for the group to provide 
meaning and guidance for its own actions, there is no need to be apologetic about seat-
of-the-pants theory not informed by a deep knowledge of major Social Theorists or 
analysts of political economy. (It is possible that a group could learn from the FIR/HSs 
of other groups, but it is also possible that they are too idiosyncratic to make sense 
beyond the group that formulated it.) This is what enactable social theorizing is about.  
 
36. 
The multi-stranded Future Ideal Retrospective/Historical Scan allows us to revisit the 
challenge mentioned in #5 of moving beyond the enthusiasm of early adopters, of 
translating innovations so that they address the pragmatic and particular concerns of 
 53 
other potential adopters. In one sense the FIR/HS requires some early adopters for the 
initial period of experimenting and refinement. Whatever emerges from that period 
would, however, be a process that, by its very nature, addresses the particular concerns 
of participants while positioning their pragmatic concerns in a context that builds in 
mutual support. 
 
I suspect that more support would be needed to bring unconscious influences to the 
surface and re-evaluate them so that they lessen their hold on the participants' 
formulation of paths ahead. One proposal, also not yet implemented, is to establish 
support circles where a person takes the initiative to recruit 5-6 people for a one-year, 
renewable relationship of mutual support, in which these people also agree to recruit 4-
5 additional other people into their own support circles (Taylor 2012c). Question: Why 
the insistence that everyone have their own support circle? Answers:  
• So you can always ask for support knowing that if it burdens or stretches the other 
person, they have support they can draw on.  
• There is a fundamental reciprocity in which everyone involved gives support from a 
position in which they recognize that they need support also. 
 
37. 
Another way to lessen the hold of the past on participants' formulation of paths ahead is 
adopt "Re-membering Conversation" and "Outsider witness retelling" rituals from 
narrative work (see #1) that "help a person or a group acknowledge multiple past allies, 
aspirations for their lives, significant discoveries, problem-solving practices, etc. so as to 
write and realize alternative scripts (or narratives) to the ones that are limiting their lives" 
(see Taylor and Rancatore 2008). 
 
38. 
Tensions are unavoidable when social theory cycles back to the concerns of the 
individual. Neo-liberal capitalism, building on the liberal origins of capitalism, 150 years 
or so earlier, emphasizes the freedom of individuals to define and pursue their own 
aspirations at the same time as it shifts attention away from the contributions by people 
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within very constrained parameters to the production and reproduction of the material 
conditions that the freely aspiring individual takes for granted. This dialectic is evident in 
the self-serving rhetoric of the current right-wing, budget-cutting government of the U.K. 
It is also evident, as historian Eley points out (#29), in the formation of an organized 
working class. Yet tension is not self-defeating contradiction for, as Palmer observed 
(#5), "self-care is never a selfish act... If we are unfaithful to true self, we will extract a 
price from others. We will make promises we cannot keep, build houses from flimsy 
stuff, conjure dreams that devolve into nightmares, and other people will suffer…"  
 
39. 
Let me leave as exercises for readers the following: 
a) identify other tensions not so labeled in these notes. 
b) list the tools and processes introduced and organize them into an ordered toolkit 
for yourself. 
c) chew on an open question: Where in Enactable Social Theorizing and the picture 
of heterogeneous intersecting processes is there is a place for strategic action? 
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